Approval Voting is an electoral method in which each voter can indicate support for as many candidates as the voter considers acceptable, with each approved candidate receiving one approval from that voter and the candidate with the highest total number of approvals being elected in a single-winner contest. The ballot does not require voters to rank approved candidates against one another. Instead, the voter makes a series of independent approve or do not approve decisions.
In a simple example involving five candidates, an elector could approve one candidate, several candidates, or potentially all candidates, depending on the rules. The winner is determined by the number of approvals received. Approval Voting is therefore distinct from plurality voting, where the voter normally selects one candidate, and from ranked systems such as STV or the Alternative Vote, where voters express an ordered preference. It is also distinct from cumulative voting because an approval is not normally weighted or multiplied. The method is particularly associated with simple ballots and straightforward counting.
The basic mathematical mechanism is aggregation of approval decisions. Every valid approval contributes one unit to the approved candidate's total. A voter can therefore support multiple candidates without having to decide which of those candidates is first, second, or third. This produces an important distinction between preference intensity and preference ordering. The ballot records a threshold of acceptability rather than a complete ranking. Voters may approve a candidate they consider acceptable even if that candidate is not their single favourite.
Whether voters actually use approval voting this way depends on their understanding of the strategic environment. Some voters may approve only one candidate, effectively behaving like plurality voters, while others may approve several candidates. The rules can also differ concerning ties, write-in candidates, ballot access, and whether approval voting is used for one office or several. The core mechanism remains simple: each candidate's approvals are counted, and the candidate receiving the greatest number wins.
Approval Voting belongs to a broader family of voting methods designed to capture more information about voter support than a single-choice ballot. Its intellectual history includes proposals for approval-based decision-making and voting reform, with modern discussions particularly associated with social choice theory and electoral-system analysis. The underlying concept is that voters may reasonably regard more than one candidate as acceptable.
Rather than forcing them to express a false distinction among several acceptable candidates, the ballot allows approval of each candidate meeting the voter's personal standard. The method has been studied mathematically in relation to strategic voting, social choice, collective decision-making, and information aggregation. Historical and contemporary applications include some organisational and local decision processes, although its use in national public elections remains much less widespread than plurality, majority, proportional, or ranked systems. The method's theoretical simplicity does not mean that voter behaviour is necessarily simple because approval thresholds are themselves strategic choices.
Approval Voting differs fundamentally from ranked-choice methods. In a ranked system, voters specify an order such as first, second, and third preference, and the counting mechanism uses that order. In Approval Voting, there is no required ranking among approved candidates. It also differs from plurality voting because a voter may approve multiple candidates rather than being restricted to one. It differs from Borda-type systems because no numerical points are assigned according to ranking position.
It differs from cumulative voting because the voter does not possess multiple transferable or assignable vote units. The distinction from a referendum-style yes or no vote is also important. Approval voting applies an approval decision separately to multiple candidates, whereas a referendum normally concerns one proposition. These distinctions demonstrate that approval voting is not simply a simplified ranked ballot but a different way of representing voter preferences.
Approval Voting has several practical implications for voters and candidates. Because voters can approve multiple candidates, candidates may have incentives to seek broad acceptability rather than relying solely on intense support from a narrow group. A voter can support a preferred candidate while also approving another candidate regarded as acceptable. However, the method does not reveal how strongly a voter prefers one approved candidate over another. Two candidates approved by the same voter receive identical approval weight.
Strategic behaviour can therefore involve deciding how many candidates to approve. A voter might approve only a favourite if worried that approving another candidate could help that candidate defeat the favourite, or might approve several candidates if the voter values broad acceptability. The existence of strategic considerations means that the theoretical interpretation of approval totals depends on behavioural assumptions. Approval voting is therefore simple to count but not necessarily behaviourally simple.
Approval Voting is particularly easy to administer compared with preferential systems requiring repeated rounds or transferable ballots. Counting consists largely of adding approval marks for each candidate. Ballot papers can be relatively straightforward, although instructions must make clear that multiple candidates may be selected. The simplicity can reduce certain counting complications associated with ranked transfers. However, the ballot's simplicity does not remove the need for clear rules concerning invalid marks, ties, candidate eligibility, and ballot secrecy.
Electronic systems must likewise ensure that voters can approve multiple candidates without accidentally limiting themselves to one selection. The administrative process is therefore simpler than many transferable voting procedures but still requires carefully specified regulations. The method can also be adapted to organisational elections, surveys, committee decisions, and other collective choices, although those applications may have different rules from public elections.
The principal conceptual limitation of Approval Voting is that it captures acceptability rather than a complete preference ordering. A voter who approves candidates A and B has not indicated whether A is preferred to B. This can be useful when the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable options is meaningful, but it means that the method discards some preference information that ranked ballots preserve. The winner can also depend heavily on each voter's approval threshold.
If voters approve only their first choice, the system approaches plurality voting. If voters approve many candidates, the result reflects broader acceptability. Thus, the same formal electoral method can generate different outcomes under different voting strategies. The system's interpretation consequently depends on assumptions about voter behaviour, information, strategic incentives, and what voters understand approval to mean.
Approval Voting is therefore a non-ranked voting method based on multiple independent candidate approvals. Its defining characteristics are the ability to approve more than one candidate, the absence of required ranking, equal counting weight for each approval, and selection of the candidate with the highest approval total in a single-winner contest. It should not be confused with proportional representation because ordinary approval voting is generally a single-winner method, although approval-based proportional methods exist as separate designs.
It should also not be confused with cumulative or preferential voting. Its significance lies in giving voters more expressive freedom than a single-choice ballot while retaining a comparatively simple counting process. Understanding its practical consequences requires considering approval thresholds, strategic voting, candidate numbers, ballot rules, and whether the election is single-winner or part of a broader multi-winner system.
