Election interference is deliberate activity intended to influence, disrupt, undermine or manipulate an election, its participants, its information environment, its infrastructure or its outcome. The term is broader than electoral fraud because interference can occur without falsifying ballots or committing a traditional voting offence. It can involve cyber attacks against election infrastructure, interference with political campaigns, deceptive information operations, intimidation, disruption of election administration or efforts to undermine confidence in electoral institutions.
The actor can be domestic or foreign, depending on the definition being used. Election interference should also be distinguished from legitimate political campaigning because political actors are expected to influence voters through lawful persuasion. The central issue is whether the methods used are covert, deceptive, unlawful, coercive or otherwise intended to distort the electoral process rather than simply participate in it.
Election interference can target different components of the electoral system. Election infrastructure includes systems used for voter registration, ballot management, voting, tabulation and transmission of results. Campaign infrastructure includes systems used by political organisations, candidates and campaigns. Interference can therefore target government databases, election management systems, campaign communications, political party networks or information channels. Cyber interference may include denial of service attacks, phishing, ransomware, credential theft or other malicious activity.
International IDEA identifies cyber attacks against election management bodies information and communication technology as one category of election related risk. The existence of a cyber incident does not automatically mean that an election was successfully manipulated because systems can be attacked without being compromised in a way that affects voting or results.
Information operations are another major form of election interference. False or deceptive information can be used to confuse voters, damage candidates, discourage participation or undermine confidence in electoral institutions. Interference can involve fabricated content, manipulated media, deceptive websites, coordinated inauthentic activity or misleading claims presented as authoritative information. The fact that information is false does not automatically establish that it is an interference operation because misinformation can arise accidentally and political communication can contain ordinary errors.
Analysis therefore considers the source, coordination, intent, methods, distribution and relationship to electoral objectives. Interference may also involve truthful information obtained unlawfully and strategically disclosed for political purposes. The important distinction is between ordinary political speech and deliberate activity designed to manipulate the electoral environment through deceptive, covert or unlawful means.
Election interference can occur before, during or after voting. Before an election, actors may target candidate systems, voter databases, campaign organisations or public information environments. During voting, interference may target election infrastructure, polling operations or communications. After voting, interference may attempt to disrupt result reporting, manipulate public interpretation of results or undermine confidence in certification. The electoral cycle therefore extends beyond polling day.
A successful attack on a campaign months before an election may influence political competition even though no ballot is directly altered. Similarly, an attack on a results website may create confusion without changing the underlying vote totals. This is why election security increasingly considers the resilience of the entire electoral ecosystem rather than focusing exclusively on voting machines or physical ballots.
Election interference can be domestic or foreign. Domestic interference can involve political actors, organisations or individuals within the country attempting to manipulate electoral conditions unlawfully. Foreign interference involves an external government or its agents engaging in prohibited activity intended to influence or undermine an election. The distinction concerns the origin or sponsorship of the activity rather than its technical method.
A cyber attack, disinformation campaign or covert funding operation could therefore be either domestic or foreign interference depending on who organised and directed it. Some incidents are difficult to attribute because actors can conceal their identities, operate through intermediaries or use infrastructure located in other countries. Attribution therefore requires evidence about control, sponsorship, technical indicators, intelligence and other contextual information rather than merely identifying where an online activity originated.
Election interference differs from election administration failure. A server outage, software error or logistical delay may disrupt an election without being deliberately caused by an actor seeking electoral advantage. International IDEA distinguishes electoral malfunctions from deliberate electoral malpractice, noting that elections are complex administrative operations vulnerable to mistakes and deficiencies. Interference generally implies deliberate activity directed at influencing or disrupting an election, although particular legal definitions may use different thresholds.
This distinction matters because calling every election disruption interference can incorrectly attribute malicious intent to ordinary technical problems. Conversely, deliberate attacks can be disguised as ordinary failures, so investigators need evidence about causation, intent and coordination. Election security therefore combines technical investigation with administrative and political analysis.
Election interference can undermine both the operation of an election and public confidence in it. An attacker does not necessarily need to alter the final vote count to cause political damage. Disrupting registration systems can prevent voters from receiving accurate information, compromising campaign networks can interfere with political communication and manipulating information can cause voters to doubt legitimate results.
The CISA framework for foreign interference illustrates this broader understanding by defining interference in terms that include influencing, undermining confidence in or altering an election or its reported result. It also identifies election infrastructure such as voter registration databases, voting machines, tabulation equipment and secure result transmission systems as relevant targets. This demonstrates why electoral resilience involves both operational security and protection of public trust.
Countering election interference requires a combination of cybersecurity, physical security, transparent election administration, information integrity, intelligence sharing, law enforcement and public communication. Election authorities can improve resilience through system testing, access controls, backups, incident response plans, audits and secure communications. Political organisations can strengthen campaign security through account protection, staff training and incident reporting. Governments can provide authoritative information to voters and explain disruptions transparently. Independent observers can document incidents and assess their effects.
Because interference can involve multiple techniques simultaneously, no single safeguard is sufficient. The key analytical distinction is between lawful political influence, administrative error and deliberate interference. Election interference describes attempts to manipulate or disrupt the electoral environment through improper means, while electoral fraud is more specifically concerned with fraudulent corruption of electoral processes and foreign interference adds the further element of external state or agent involvement.
